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COMMENTS
THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES,
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures.' This prohibition generally requires that any search be
based upon a warrant issued pursuant to probable cause.2 A search
conducted without a warrant usually is regarded as per se unreason-
able.3 There are, however, exceptions to this warrant requirement.4
One "well-settled" exception to the warrant requirement of the
1 The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
643-60 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914). See also I W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 438-39 (1978); Comment, Constitutional Law-
Search and Seizure-Third Party Consent to Warrantless Searches and Seizures-United States v.
Diggs, 30 RUrTGERS L. REV. 1056 (1977).
Probable cause exists where the police officers have knowledge of or reasonably
trustworthy information about facts and circumstances that are sufficient in themselves
to cause a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed.
See E. CORWIN, THE CONsTrruriON 342-43 (1978). See also Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 313 (1959); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1924).
S See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). The rule that most
warrantless searches are per se unreasonable was derived by reading the reasonableness
requirement found in the first clause of the fourth amendment together with the warrant
requirement found in the second clause of the amendment. See Comment, Third Party
Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 798 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law-
Search and Seizure-Third Party Consent, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 807 (1970).
4 Exceptions to the warrant requirement include: (1) searches of a vehicle, upon
probable cause, for the fruits and instrumentalities of a crime, Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42 (1970); (2) searches incident to a valid arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); (3) "stop and frisk" searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and (4)




fourth amendment "is a search that is conducted pursuant to
consent." 5
The most obvious application of the so-called consent search
exception occurs when the party at whom the search is directed and
whose property is to be searched is the party who consents to the
search. 6 The consent search exception to the requirements of the
fourth amendment also may be used to validate a search in which
the party who gives the consent is not the party at whom the search
is directed. 7 Searches in such situations have been upheld as valid
consent searches provided the consenting party had some close re-
lationship with the property to be searched or the person at whom
the search was directed." Such searches are called third-party con-
sent searches. 9
In 1974, the United States Supreme Court for the first time ex-
pressly considered the question of whether the consent exception to
fourth amendment warrant requirements could be extended to
third-party consent searches. 10  In Matlock v. United States," the
Court upheld the validity of a search based upon the consent of a
third party.
Because of the uncomplicated fact situation involved in Matlock,
the Supreme Court did not have to address directly some of the
more complex issues that may arise once a search pursuant to third-
5 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 (citing Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946);
Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946)).
6 See, e.g., E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 346; Note, supra note 3, at 808; Comment,
supra note 3, at 800.
7 See, e.g., E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 347; Note, supra note 3, at 808; Comment,
supra note 3, at 801.
8 See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United States v. Stone,
471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); White v. United States,
444 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wixom, 441 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Alloway, 397 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1968); Roberts v. United States, 332
F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945 (1965); United States v. Eldridge, 302
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1962); Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964). See also
Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party
Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 211, 254-55 (1974); Comment, supra note 3, at 801;
Note, supra note 3, at 808. See generally Comment, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure,
1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 12, 21-24, 25-30; Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1953).
9 See, e.g., Matthews, Third Party Consent Searches: Some Necessary Safeguards, 10 VAL.
U.L. REV. 29 (1976); Comment, Relevance of the Absent Party's Whereabouts in Third Party
Consent Searches, 53 B.U.L. REV. 1087 (1973).
10 Several third-party consent cases, however, previously had reached the Supreme
Court. The first such case was Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). In Amos, the
Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether a wife could consent to a
search of the family home when that search was directed at her husband. Later cases
seem to have implicitly recognized the validity of third-party consent searches. See Wef-
ing & Miles, supra note 8, at 255-60; infra note 104.
11 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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party consent is recognized as a valid exception to fourth amend-
ment requirements. 12 This Comment will address one particularly
troublesome issue that can arise under the third-party consent doc-
trine: the situation in which one or more of the co-occupants of a
property who are present when permission to search is sought agree
to the search, while one or more of the other present co-occupants
register their objections to the search. This Comment will first ex-
amine the issue in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Matlock,
and will show that, in light of that opinion, a search made pursuant
to the consent of one present co-occupant, but over the objection of
another, must be held to be valid. This result will then be used to
illustrate the Supreme Court's failure to develop a test for applying
the third-party consent exception that is completely satisfactory
under fourth amendment standards, as well as the Court's failure to
develop a theoretical rationale that logically embraces both the gen-
eral consent and the third-party consent exceptions to the fourth
amendment. Finally, this Comment will argue that because of these
two failures, the Supreme Court has not shown the third-party con-
sent search exception, and possibly even the general consent search
exception, to be consistent with the mandates of the fourth amend-
ment, and that serious reevaluation of these doctrines by the
Supreme Court is thus in order.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S MATLOCK DECISION
The Supreme Court first expressly recognized the validity of
third-party consent searches in Matlock v. United States.' 3 The rela-
12 For example, in Matlock, the defendant was not actually present when the police
requested the third party's consent to search. Id. at 166. The Supreme Court therefore
did not have to address the question of whether a third-party consent would be valid if
the person at whom the search was directed was present but ignored by police when they
requested permission to search (i.e., police knew the potential defendant was there but
chose instead to request permission to search from a third party whom they felt would
be more likely to consent). Nor did the Court have to discuss what would be the effect of
a defendant who was present but silent when the third party granted permission to
search (i.e., the police did not realize that the other person present when they requested
permission to search was actually the potential defendant, and the potential defendant
did not identify himself or herself and made no comment regarding the search). Both of
these issues may have been resolved indirectly by the Court because the decision in Mat-
lock indicates that the availability of the defendant to give his or her consent is immate-
rial. See infra text accompanying notes 35-39, 52-54. In addition, because Matlock made
no objection to the search prior to its occurrence, 415 U.S. at 166, the Supreme Court
did not have to consider the question of whether the objection of the party at whom the
search was directed, whether or not he or she was present at the time of the search,
would suffice to invalidate a third-party consent search.
13 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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tively uncomplicated circumstances of that case,' 4 however, did not
require the Court to examine the implications of more complex
third-party consent situations. Matlock was arrested prior to the
time that the search occurred, was not asked for his permission to
search, and was not with the third party when police sought consent
to search. 15 Thus, the Supreme Court did not have to address even
so simple a situation as one in which the person at whom the search
was directed had a realistic opportunity to object to the search but
did not, much less the more complex situation in which such an ob-
jection actually occurred. As a result, the Supreme Court was able
to adopt a third-party consent exception to the requirements of the
fourth amendment without carefully examining the parameters of
such an exception, and without clearly articulating the constitutional
bases for the exception. As one pair of commentators has observed:
"[Although] Matlock afforded the Court another opportunity to ex-
amine the third party consent issue and to explore the constitutional
basis for its previous position of [impliedly] permitting such
searches. . . .[t]he Court refrained. . from a close scrutiny of the
constitutional justification for this type of search .... 16
In fact, the Court's discussion of the third-party consent issue in
Matlock was very brief. The Court first noted that a third-party con-
sent doctrine had been accepted by a number of lower courts.' 7
The Court then pointed out that the question of whether "a wife's
permission to search the residence in which she lived with her hus-
band could 'waive his constitutional rights' "18 had been specifically
reserved in Amos v. United States.' 9 The Court went on to say, how-
ever, that "more recent authority here clearly indicates that the con-
sent of one who possesses common authority over premises or
effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with
14 Matlock was arrested by police in front of the home where he lived with his girl-
friend, Mrs. Gayle Graff, her parents, and other members of her family. Mrs. Graff's
parents rented the home. After the arrest, and without asking Matlock which room in
the house he occupied or if he would consent to a search, the police went to the door of
the house. Mrs. Graff allowed them to enter the house and told them that she and Mat-
lock shared the east bedroom on the second floor. Mrs. Graff also gave the police her
consent to search that bedroom. The search revealed incriminating evidence that was
admitted at Matlock's trial. Id. at 166.
The technical issue in the case was whether certain hearsay evidence was admissible
and legally sufficient to "satisfactorily prove Mrs. Graff's actual authority to consent to
the search." Id. at 168.
15 Id. at 166.
16 Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 261.
17 415 U.S. at 170.
18 Id.
19 255 U.S. 313 (1921).
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whom that authority is shared." 20 Then the Court stated that one of
its prior cases2 ' had held that "a consent search is fundamentally
different in nature from the waiver of a trial right." 22 With this
statement, the Court implied that the consent search exception need
not be imbued with the same protections and prohibitions as are
applicable before a defendant may waive a trial right. This position
could serve to increase the likelihood of recognition of valid third-
party consents. 23
The Court concluded its discussion of the third-party consent
issue with the sweeping pronouncement that the cases cited by the
Court2 4 established that a search may be validated by the consent of
a third party who has "common authority over" or a "sufficient rela-
tionship to" the object of the search. 25 In adopting "common au-
thority" as the criterion for judging the validity of third-party
consent searches, the Court ratified the property-oriented approach
to third-party consent searches that had been adopted by many
lower federal26 and state27 courts, and which is frequently called the
20 415 U.S. at 170. The two cases cited by the Court, however, do not fully support
that statement. In one of the two cases cited by the Court, Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731
(1969), the party who consented to the search was the party at whom the search was
directed. In the other case, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court
concluded that there was no search that needed to be evaluated under fourth amend-
ment standards. An examination of the facts of these two cases, see infra note 104,
reveals that they provide a very weak foundation for the Court's assertion of a long-
accepted tradition of upholding third-party consent searches. By definition, a third-
party consent search involves a search that must be evaluated by fourth amendment
standards (unlike the search in Coolidge), and typically does not involve a situation (like
the one in Frazier) where the person giving his or her consent is the person at whom the
search is directed as well as the person with authority over the property being searched.
21 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
22 415 U.S. at 171 (citing id.).
23 See infra text accompanying notes 98-105.
24 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). The problems inherent in
relying on Frazier and Coolidge as a basis for a third-party consent exception to the fourth
amendment are discussed supra note 20. The Supreme Court did not explain its pur-
pose in citing the Schneckloth holding that a consent search differs from a waiver of a trial
right. The reason why rejection of a waiver approach to the general consent exception
might serve to make third-party consents more constitutionally acceptable is discussed
infra notes 98-105.
25 The Court said:
These cases at least make clear that when the prosecution seeks tojustify a warrant-
less search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was
given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from
a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship
to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
415 U.S. at 171.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Stone, 471 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 866
(1972); United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wixom, 441
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"possession and control" or "access and control" test. 28 The Court
provided a brief explanation of the meaning of "common authority"
when it stated that common authority was not derived from prop-
erty concepts, but rather from the fact of joint access and control
that makes it "reasonable to recognize" that all parties having such
control have the right to consent to the search and have assumed
the risk that one of them might do so.2 9
The Court's discussion of third-party consent made no mention
of the particular facts of the Matlock case.30 Thus, there is no reason
to assume that the third-party consent exception, or the "possession
and control" test for determining the validity of third-party consent
searches, would be limited to the particular situation involved in
Matlock. For example, although Matlock was not asked for his con-
sent and was not present when the police officers sought consent
from the third party,3' the Court's final formulation of the third-
party consent exception does not require that the person at whom
the search is directed be absent at the time of the search. 32 The
F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1971); United States v. Cataldo, 433 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); United States exrel. Cabey v. Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d
Cir. 1970); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 373 (5th Cir. 1970), vacated on other
grounds, 400 U.S. 17 (1970); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Wright v. United States, 389 F.2d 996 (8th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Airdo, 380 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 913 (1967); Nelson
v. California, 346 F.2d 73 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 964 (1965); Burge v. United
States, 342 F.2d 408 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 829 (1965); Roberts v. United States,
332 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 945 (1965). See generally Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 1078, 1086-88.
27 See, e.g., People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955); People v. Howard,
166 Cal. App. 2d 638, 334 P.2d 105 (1958); People v. Haskell, 41111. 2d 25, 241 N.E.2d
430 (1968); People v. Walker, 34 Ill. 2d 23, 213 N.E.2d 552 (1966); Nestor v. State, 243
Md. 438, 221 A.2d 364 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Cabey v. Rundle, 432 Pa. 466, 248
A.2d 197 (1968); State v. Cairo, 74 R.I. 377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948); Burge v. State, 443
S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 934 (1969). See generally Annot., 31
A.L.R.2d 1078, 1086-88.
28 See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 9, at 30; Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 212, 261;
Comment, supra note 9, at 1105; Comment, supra note 2, at 1061; Comment, supra note
3, at 804.
29 The Court stated:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a
third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent
does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refine-
ments, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having
joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that
any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and
that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
common area to be searched.
415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (citations omitted).
30 Id. at 169-72.
31 Id. at 166.
32 Early in its discussion, the Supreme Court did say that previous cases indicate that
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Court, however, had no cause to address the question of whether
the third-party consent exception that it created is broad enough to
cover the situation in which the party at whom the search is directed
is present and/or objects to the search.
The Court's decision in Matlock thus failed to articulate an ana-
lytical framework for the third-party consent exception. Instead, the
Court merely relied upon a few prior Supreme Court decisions that
were accepted uncritically as providing a foundation for the third-
party consent search exception. The Court also failed to delineate
the intended scope of the third-party consent search exception. An
analytical framework at least would have allowed lower courts to de-
velop the parameters of the third-party consent search exception on
their own. They would be able to examine the validity of searches in
difficult situations, such as that in which two co-occupants are pres-
ent and one consents to the search while the other objects, in light
of the purposes and policies of the third-party consent exception.
Instead of providing such a framework, the Court merely adopted
the "possession and control" test that had been used by lower fed-
eral33 and state3 4 courts to validate third-party consent searches. As
will be demonstrated, the Supreme Court's failure to develop an an-
alytical framework that could explain or define the parameters of the
third-party consent, exception has resulted in disagreement among
lower courts over the results that are mandated in particular situa-
tions by the Supreme Court's "possession and control" test. This
disagreement is most evident in the "disagreeing co-occupant" situ-
ation that is the focus of this Comment.
III. SOME STATE AND LOWER FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ON
THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES OF JOINTLY OCCUPIED
PREMISES WHEN ONE OF THE CO-OCCUPANTS
WHO IS PRESENT OBJECTS TO THE
SEARCH
Subsequent to the Matlock decision, a number of courts have
held that a search conducted pursuant to the consent of one present
co-occupant and over the objection of another present co-occupant
the consent of one with common authority over the property being searched is valid
against an "absent, nonconsenting person." Id. at 170 (emphasis added). See supra text
accompanying note 20. The Court's final formulation, however, makes no mention of
the non-consenting party's whereabouts. See supra note 25. The mention of an absent
party earlier in the discussion, therefore, should not be regarded as limiting the third-
party consent search exception.
33 See supra note 26.
34 See supra note 27.
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is constitutionally permissible.3 5 These courts take the position that
this situation falls squarely within the Matlock ruling, although they
do not necessarily agree on the reasons for this conclusion. Some
courts, noting that the defendant in Matlock was present in the front
yard of the residence that was searched immediately prior to the
time when police solicited the third party's consent to search, argue
that the Supreme Court could not have considered it important that
the party at whom the search was directed was "absent" at the time
of a third-party consent search.3 6 These courts state that the de-
fendant's "absence" was not a deciding factor in Matlock; police
could have sought his permission if they had wanted to. These
courts therefore conclude that the presence of a defendant should
not alter the availability of third-party consent searches.
Another rationale used by courts that find searches conducted
over the objection of one co-occupant to be valid is that, under Mat-
lock, joint occupants lose their expectation of privacy in their resi-
dence. That is, upon moving in with another person or persons,
joint occupants assume the risk that such other person or persons
will allow police to search the residence. Some courts reason that if
one assumes the risk by becoming a joint occupant, the assumption
of risk cannot be altered by objecting to a search.37
35 See, e.g., United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Canada, 527 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776,
180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982); People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422
N.Y.S.2d 652 (1979).
36 See, e.g., Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687; Canada, 527 F.2d at 1379.
In Sumlin, the defendant (Sumlin) was arrested in the apartment that he apparently
shared with one Edith Alexander. After the arrest, agents asked Sumlin for permission
to search the apartment, and he refused. Only then, according to Sumlin, did the police
ask Ms. Alexander for her permission to search. She gave them permission, and the
search revealed evidence that was later admitted at Sumlin's trial. Sumlin, 567 F.2d at
686.
In responding to Sumlin's contention that his initial refusal to consent to the search
of his apartment precluded a search based on Ms. Alexander's consent, the court found
that Matlock had settled that a third person with common authority over a defendant's
premises or effects can consent to a search of those premises or effects. Id. at 687. The
court went on to rebut the argument that such a consent is valid only in the absence of
the party at whom the search was directed by noting that "Matlock did not depend on the
defendant's absence for the defendant there had just been arrested in the front yard of
the residence when the third person's consent to search was procured." Id.
Canada similarly upheld a third-party consent search conducted in the presence of
the defendant. Although the defendant in Canada made no obvious objection to the
search, the court's analysis of the issue, which is almost identical to that found in Sumlin,
indicates that any objection on the part of the defendant would have made no difference
to the decision regarding the validity of the search. Canada, 527 F.2d at 1379.
37 See, e.g., Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688; Canada, 527 F.2d at 1379; Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d at
856, 640 P.2d at 786, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
For example, the court in Sumlin said that it could not find any constitutional signifi-
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Finally, some courts stress that the consenting co-occupant, as a
resident of the premises, has an independent right to permit police
cance in the fact that Sumlin initially had denied the officers his permission to search the
apartment. Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687-88. The Court characterized the rationale behind
the Matlock rule as being "that a joint occupant assumes the risk of his co-occupant
exposing their common private areas to such a search." Id. at 688. Under such condi-
tions, the court commented, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of
the defendant. Id. Sumlin's initial refusal to consent could not in any way lessen the
risk, which he had assumed upon agreeing to share an apartment, that his co-occupant
would consent to a search. So the "slight factual dissimilarity" from Matlock was held
insufficient to require invalidation of the search. Id. The court observed in a footnote
that "Alexander was the only party to sign the lease (although the lease was made out in
both her name and in Sumlin's assumed name), indicating [that] she had primary au-
thority over the apartment." Id. at n.12. Although this fact does not facially affect the
court's analysis, which is made in terms of "common authority," it may have been a
factor in the opinion.
Canada likewise stressed that by granting a third party common authority over the
property that was later searched, the defendant assumed the risk that the third party
would consent to just such a search. Canada, 527 F.2d at 1379.
In Haskett, the defendant was arrested and detained on the front porch of his house.
His wife then came to the door and asked police what they wanted. The police re-
sponded that they were investigating a crime and asked if they could come into the
house and talk to her about it. She agreed, and once they were inside the house, she
consented to a search. A few minutes later, although the search had not as yet revealed
any evidence, one of the police officers left the house to handcuff the defendant and
place him in the police car. At this time, the officer apparently asked for the defendant's
permission to conduct a search of the house, and permission was denied. The officer
then returned to the house and continued the search (with the wife's consent). The
search eventually turned up the incriminating evidence that was used in defendant's
trial. 30 Cal. 3d at 856, 640 P.2d at 785, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
The defendant claimed that this was a case of first impression that "require[d] a
special rule vitiating the consent of one co-occupant when the other is present and pro-
tests the entry or search." Id. at 856, 640 P.2d at 785, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 649. The court,
however, could perceive no relevant distinction between the facts in this case and those
in Matlock. In fact, the court concluded that the Supreme Court in Matlock had clearly
"recognized that law enforcement authorities need not seek the consent of all co-occu-
pants before searching their commonly held property .... ." Id. at 856, 640 P.2d at
786, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650. The Supreme Court did not explicitly state this rule, of
course, but the position is implicit in the holding that Matlock's failure to consent was
irrelevant. Also, it can be argued that the rule is reasonably evident from the Supreme
Court's statement that "the others [may] have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched." Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (emphasis
added). It is this language that the California Supreme Court cites for its proposition.
Haskett, 30 Cal. 3d at 856, 640 P.2d at 786, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
The court in Haskett, however, did state that "the assumption of risk inherent in co-
occupancy has its limits. An entry or search, even though authorized by a co-occupant,
may be so intrusive that it belies the conclusion that the parties assumed or even con-
templated the risk of its occurrence by deciding to jointly inhabit the subject residence."
Id. at 857, 640 P.2d at 786, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650. But because the police in this case
"made their identity and purpose known to defendant, in his presence sought and ob-
tained his wife's consent to enter, and validly arrested and removed him from the house
before he expressly refused consent to search," the wife's consent was held fully ade-
quate to uphold the search. Id. at 857, 640 P.2d at 786, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 650.
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to search the premises.3 8 These courts find this position to be en-
tirely consistent with the Supreme Court's discussion of assumption
of risk in Matlock.39
Acceptance of the validity of searches made over the objection
of one co-occupant is, however, by no means universal. Several
commentators40 and a number of lower courts41 assumed, prior to
38 See Cosine, 48 N.Y.2d at 292-93, 397 N.E.2d at 1322, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
In Cosine, the Court of Appeals of New York upheld the validity of a search based on
the consent of one co-occupant when another co-occupant was present and objected to
the search. In Cosine, the defendant, Cosme, and his fiancee, Meryle Hennessey, with
whom he shared an apartment "on at least a part-time basis," had an argument. She
called the police and told them that the defendant had a gun and cocaine in the shared
apartment. The police agreed to send over a patrol car, and Hennessey met the police in
the outer vestibule of the apartment. Hennessey then told the officers that the items
were stored in a closet that she shared with the defendant and drew a diagram to show
the officers exactly where in the apartment the closet was located. She also gave the
officers the key to the apartment and told them how to use it without setting off the
burglar alarm. The police then went upstairs, unlocked the apartment door, and let
themselves in. They saw the defendant and another man standing in the kitchen, and
ordered them to "freeze," then handcuffed them and ordered them to lie face down on
the floor. 48 N.Y.2d at 289, 397 N.E.2d at 1320-21, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
The defendant claimed that his protestations upon being handcuffed by the officers
constituted a refusal to consent to a search of the premises. The court found it unneces-
sary to reach that issue in light of its conclusion that "any refusal on the part of defend-
ant to consent to a search would have been ineffective in the face of Hennessey's
contrary expression of consent." 48 N.Y.2d at 290, 297 N.E.2d at 1321, 422 N.Y.S.2d at
654.
The court reached its conclusion by considering the "theoretical underpinnings of
the third party consent rule." Id. at 291, 397 N.E.2d at 1321-22, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
The court stated that the third-party consent rule in New York was not based on agency
principles, nor on the theory that "one co-occupant may commit another to a binding
waiver of an important constitutional right .... " Instead, the court said that the rule
was based on the theory that one co-occupant has authority in his or her own right to
permit a search of the premises that he or she occupies and that a party who shares
control over the premises with another has no reasonable expectation of privacy in those
premises. The court then noted that this position is the one expressed by the United
States Supreme Court in Matlock. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d at 290, 397 N.E.2d at 1322, 422
N.Y.S.2d at 655.
The court reasoned that because third-party consent searches do not depend on
one party's authority to waive another's constitutional rights, and because there is no
constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in a shared premises, a co-
occupant has no grounds for objection if and when another co-occupant voluntarily con-
sents to a police search of the jointly occupied premises. Id. at 292, 397 N.E.2d at 1322,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 655.
39 See id. at 291, 397 N.E.2d at 1322, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 655
40 See, e.g., W. RINGEL, SEARCHES & SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS § 9.5(f) (2d
ed. 1980); N. SOBEL, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 130
(1964); Matthews, supra note 9, at 36; Comment, supra note 9, at 1090; Note, supra note
3, at 812; Comment, supra note 8, at 13, 31; MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCE-
DURE § 240.3 comment (Proposed Draft No. 1, 1972) ("It seems clear that a consent
once given by X may be withdrawn or limited by Y, who has equal or superior control
over the premises.").
41 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 479 F.2d 300 (7th Cir. 1973); Lucero v. Dono-
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Matlock, that the "possession and control" test, which was adopted
by the Court, could not validate such searches. 42 The commenta-
tors relied almost exclusively on the notion that third-party consent
searches in general, and especially those made over the objection of
the person at whom the search is directed, cannot be reconciled with
the universal recognition of the personal nature of the rights pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. 45 Other rationales utilized by
courts and commentators who believe that the consent of one co-
occupant should not be allowed to override the objection of another
present co-occupant include: (1) the idea that the right of a third
party to consent to search springs from his or her possessory inter-
est in the property, and thus his or her consent cannot be regarded
as "stronger" than the objection of a party whose right to object to
the search springs from the same possessory interest,44 and (2) the
idea that there should be a policy of promoting "peace and tranquil-
ity" between joint occupants. 45
At least one court since the Matlock decision has adopted the
position that third-party consent searches made over the objection
of one co-occupant are not valid. In Silva v. State,46 the Florida
van, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965); People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App. 3d 357, 369, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 561, 568 (1976); Lawton v. State, 320 So. 2d 463 (Fla. App. 1975); Dorsey v. State,
2 Md. App. 40, 232 A.2d 900 (1967).
42 One case that is frequently cited by courts and commentators in support of the
proposition that a valid search may not be made over the objection of one with common
authority in the property is Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 27
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1963). In that case, the court said:
Joint occupancy of property, particularly residential property, obviously demands
reasonable restrictions on the right of each joint occupant either by himself or
through another to exercise full control over the property at all times regardless of
the wishes of another joint occupant present on the premises. A joint occupant's
right of privacy in his home is not completely at the mercy of another with whom he
shares legal possession.
Id. at 69, 378 P.2d at 116, 27 Cal. Rptr at 892. Despite this passage, which supports the
position for which the case is so frequently cited, the actual holding of the case was in
fact limited to the situation where a co-occupant who is away from the premises consents
to a search that is objected to by a co-occupant who is present upon the premises, and
the officer conducting the search does not even "disclose his purpose to the occupant
who is present or. . . inform him that he has the consent of the absent [co-]occupant to
enter." Id.
Surprisingly enough, the California Supreme Court, which decided Tompkins, is also
one of the courts that has specifically held since the Matlock decision that a search con-
ducted pursuant to the consent of one co-occupant but over the objection of another,
when both are present at the time of the search, may be upheld. See People v. Haskett,
30 Cal. 3d 841, 640 P.2d 776, 180 Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982); discussion supra note 37.
43 Note, supra note 3, at 812. See also N. SOBEL, supra note 40, at 130; Wefing & Miles,
supra note 8, at 279; Comment, supra note 9, at 1090.
44 See, e.g., Robinson, 479 F.2d at 302; Dorsey, 2 Md. App. at 44, 232 A.2d 900 at 902.
45 See, e.g., Lawton, 320 So. 2d at 465.
46 344 So. 2d 559 (Fla. 1977). The facts involved in Silva are almost exactly the same
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Supreme Court stated that all third-party consent cases that have
come before the United States Supreme Court "involve[d] fact situ-
ations in which the evidence was used against a party who was ab-
sent when consent to search was given."' 47 The court said that,
based on previous United States Supreme Court decisions, the
rights of a person whose property is to be searched are "personal to
him and derive from the United States Constitution." 48 The Florida
court then reasoned that such rights should not be ignored merely
"because of a leasehold or other property interest shared with an-
other."' 49 The court took the position that there is a valid distinction
between a situation in which the defendant is present and objecting
to the search and one in which he or she is unavailable to police.50
The court also stated that a joint occupant's objection to a search
must carry particular weight "where the police are aware that the
person objecting is the one whose constitutional rights are at
stake." 51
as those in Cosme, where the New York court upheld the search. See supra note 38. In
Silva, one Mrs. Brandon and the defendant leased and lived in an apartment together.
One morning, defendant hit Mrs. Brandon in the mouth. She left the apartment, called
the police, and told them that the defendant was a convicted felon and that he kept guns
in a closet in the apartment. Mrs. Brandon was waiting outside for the police when they
arrived. When she attempted to let the police into the apartment, Mrs. Brandon discov-
ered that the door was locked. She then put her hand through the jalousies and un-
locked the door from the inside. After she and the police officers went into the
apartment, she told the police that the guns were in the hall closet. The defendant at this
point forbade the officers to search the closet. Id. at 560.
The only possibly significant difference between the facts of this case and those
involved in Cosine is that the closet that was searched here contained only the defendant's
belongings. The closet thus was not shared by the defendant and Mrs. Brandon in the
sense that both had things stored in it. Id. Both Mrs. Brandon and her son, however,
could and did occasionally go into the closet. Id. The Florida court's analysis of the
validity of consent by one co-occupant when the other co-occupant objects did not, how-
ever, turn on the degree of control that Mrs. Brandon exerted over the closet. See id. at
562.
47 Id. The Florida court cites United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Coo-
lidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); and Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969),
for this proposition. There is some problem with relying on these three cases for this
proposition. In Matlock, the "absent" defendant was standing just outside his house
when the search occurred. 415 U.S. at 166. See supra note 14. In Coolidge, the Court did
not treat what had happened as a search for purposes of review. 403 U.S. at 489-90. See
supra note 20. Frazier was not a typical third-party consent search case because the con-
senting party was the person at whom the search was directed, and he had possession of
the property that was to be searched. 394 U.S. at 740. See supra note 20.
48 344 So. 2d at 562-63 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
49 Id. at 562.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 563 (footnote omitted).
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IV. THE MATLOCK TEST AND THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES OF
JOINTLY OCCUPIED PREMISES WHEN ONE OF THE CO-
OCCUPANTS WHO IS PRESENT OBJECTS TO THE
SEARCH
The courts that have held that Matlock requires validation of
searches consented to by one co-occupant but objected to by an-
other are correct. Intuitively unappealing as it may be to think that
one's objection to a police search of one's own home can be overrid-
den by a consent given by another occupant of that home, the "pos-
session and control" test articulated in Matlock does seem to
mandate just such a result.
First, as was noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Sumlin,52 the facts of Matlock do not support the con-
clusion that the outcome of that case turned upon the absence of the
defendant when the third-party consent was given. Matlock was
present in the front yard of his home and had contact with the police
officers just moments before they asked another co-occupant of the
house for her permission to search. 53 Thus, Matlock was not "ab-
sent" in any meaningful sense of the word. He was readily available
to give or withhold his consent. Yet, both the officers and the
Supreme Court seemed to regard his presence, and his consent or
lack thereof, as irrelevant to the validity of the search.
Second, the Court's final conclusion about third-party consent
made no mention of the location of the defendant at the time of the
search. Rather, the Court merely stated that "when the prosecution
seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it
is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but
may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party
"54
Of course, that the Supreme Court regarded the defendant's
presence at the place being searched as constitutionally irrelevant
does not necessarily mean that the Court would look upon a defend-
ant's presence at and objection to the search with a similar disinter-
est. The test for determining the validity of a third-party consent
search as articulated in Matlock, however, provides no basis for the
idea that the defendant's objection would invalidate the search.
Under the Court's test, the validity of a search based upon the
consent of a third party is premised upon his or her "common au-
thority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects
52 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977).
53 415 U.S. at 166.
54 Id. at 171.
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sought to be inspected." 5 5 "Common authority," in turn, is based
on "mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or
control for most purposes." 56 Thus, the validity of the third party's
consent is based on his or her relationship to the property being
searched. This relationship necessarily must have developed before
the consent to search is sought. The defendant's objection to the
search at the time consent to search is sought can in no way alter the
prior relationship on which the validity of the third party's consent
is based. If the defendant's objection cannot alter the facts that
make the consent search valid, it obviously cannot render the con-
sent search itself invalid.
Furthermore, the Court stated that "common authority" may
serve as the basis for a valid third-party consent because such au-
thority makes it "reasonable to recognize that. . . [the other occu-
pants] have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched." 5 7 Presumably, this means that
the co-occupants assumed the risk when they decided to live in a
jointly occupied residence. As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
observed in Sumlin,58 a defendant's objection at the time of the
search cannot rebut the presumption that he knew what he was do-
ing and "assumed the risk" when he decided to live in jointly occu-
pied premises. If the assumption of risk is not nullified by the
defendant's objection to the search, then the basis for the validity of
the third-party consent is likewise not eliminated, and the search
must be held valid.59
55 Id.
56 Id. at n.7. The Supreme Court also said that the ability to consent to a search
could be based on "some other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects .... "
Id. at 171. The Court did not explain what would constitute a "sufficient relationship,"
but it seems clear from the ambiguity of the phrase that this test was intended to be less
generally applicable than the "common authority" standard. That is, "common author-
ity" was intended to be the standard by which most third-party consent searches are
judged. Perhaps if the "common authority" standard could not be met in a particular
case, but the third party still had a substantial interest in the property that was searched,
the search would still be validated under the "sufficient relationship" test. Two com-
mentators had this to say about the "sufficient relationship" standard: "It is questiona-
ble whether this concept adds anything to the possession and control doctrine or
whether it further serves to confuse an already amorphous concept." Wefing & Miles,
supra note 8, at 213 n.12.
57 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
58 567 F.2d at 684.
59 Presumably, a finding of assumption of risk could be avoided if the co-occupants
had entered into a contract when they first moved in together that said that neither party
would ever agree to permit a common area to be searched. If assumption of risk forms
the basis for allowing common authority to validate a search based on the consent of a
third party with such authority, then the logical conclusion is that the premises subject to
the above-mentioned contract could never be the object of a valid third-party consent
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A theory that would allow a defendant's presence during and
objection to a third-party consent search to invalidate that search
thus finds no theoretical support in the Matlock decision. In addi-
tion, the application of such a theory in third-party consent cases
would create an obvious practical anomaly. A rule holding that a
defendant could invalidate a search if he or she were present and
objected to the search, but could not invalidate the search if he or
she were absent when the search took place, would be tantamount
to a holding that the defendant's constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable searches of his or her home stops when he or she
walks out the door. The defendant's rights would depend upon the
fortuity of his or her location when the police conduct the search. It
should not be assumed the Court would create such an anomaly
willingly.
There are two possible theories that could eliminate the anoma-
lous effect of a holding that a present defendant should be able to
invalidate a third-party consent search while an absent defendant
should not. The first involves a presumption that an absent defend-
ant would not object to the search if he or she were present.
Although it would explain why an absent defendant would not be
permitted to invalidate a third-party consent search, this position is
clearly untenable because by definition a third-party consent search
is directed at the absent party. If the search is challenged in court,
the search must have revealed some incriminating evidence that the
state is attempting to use against the absent party. It is difficult to
imagine anyone who would be more likely to object to a search than
this absent suspect who had incriminating evidence stored on the
premises that were to be searched.
The second theory that could support a different result when
the defendant is absent than when he or she is present and objecting
at the time of the search could be that the reasonableness of the
search depends heavily upon the police officers' perceptions of the
situation at the time the search occurs.6 0 If the police are granted
permission to search by a party apparently in control of the prem-
ises and no one objects to the search, the police may be reasonable
search. This result clearly would provide advantages to those clever enough (or those
planning far enough ahead on engaging in criminal activities) to enter into pre-cohabita-
tion contracts. The Supreme Court could, however, circumvent this problem by declar-
ing that the a'ssumption of risk inheres in the nature of the living arrangement and
cannot be altered by contract. Or, perhaps more persuasively, the Supreme Court could
hold that such contracts are void as against public policy because their sole intent is to
exclude police from the premises (as opposed to other visitors, guests, business invitees,
etc. of the co-occupants).
60 See Comment, supra note 9, at 1110; Comment, supra note 8, at 32-34.
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in assuming that there is no reason to discontinue the search. If one
co-occupant objects to the search, however, that objection should
alert the police to the fact that more than one person's rights are
involved in the premises and the search. The search should not
then proceed lest those rights be violated.
This argument seems to have had some effect on the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Silva.6 1 Although the argument ini-
tially may seem appealing, it suffers from three major flaws. First,
such a " 'police viewpoint' argument cannot be carried too far with-
out raising the specter of fourth amendment protection so porous
that almost any type of consent search will escape constitutional
sanction .... "62 If searches are validated merely because police
think that they are reasonable, very few searches will be found con-
stitutionally invalid.63 Such a "police viewpoint" argument would
61 344 So. 2d at 563.
62 Comment, supra note 9, at 1110. This commentator addresses the "police view-
point" argument generally rather than as support for reaching a different conclusion
about the validity of a search depending upon the location of the defendant. Specifi-
cally, he states that a police viewpoint rationale is "undoubtedly" one factor that per-
suades courts to uphold the validity of third-party consent searches. Id.
[I]f the police obtain consent to search a house from someone who reasonably ap-
pears to them to be in control of the premises and in a position to authorize them to
enter, it would be of little social utility for a court subsequently to rebuke the of-
ficers by excluding the evidence they obtained during the search. . . because they
failed to observe a subtle distinction drawn by a defense attorney with 20/20
hindsight.
Id.
63 Despite this problem with a "police viewpoint" approach to searches, there is
some judicial support for the approach. For example, in Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964), the Supreme Court held that a search of a hotel guest's room based upon
the consent of the hotel clerk was invalid. The Court mentioned, however, that the
police had been given no basis to believe that the guest had authorized the clerk to allow
police to search his room. Id. at 489. This could suggest "that the case might have gone
the other way had the police been given reasonable grounds for such a belief." Com-
ment, supra note 9, at 1093 n.27.
See also United States v. DiPrima, 472 F.2d 550, 551-52 (Ist Cir. 1973) ("[w]e cannot
pronounce a rule that will answer all cases, except to say that to some extent the police
must be allowed to rely upon ...general appearances"); United States v. Martinez,
450 F.2d 864, 865 (8th Cir. 1971) ("legal and possessory rights to the premises or items
searched, [the consenter's] relationship to the subject of the search, and the circum-
stances as they objectively appear to the police at the time of the search are all to be considered
....") (emphasis added); People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d 469 (1955) ("in
which the California Supreme Court held that a homeowner had authority to consent to
the search of his tenant's room, on the ground that both the homeowner and the police
entertained the (mistaken) belief that the homeowner had such authority." Comment,
supra note 9, at 1093 n.28).
Most recently, the Supreme Court has ruled on a police "good faith" exception to
the exclusionary rule in the context of searches made with a warrant (i.e. not consent or
other warrantless searches). United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984). In that case,
the Court held that evidence obtained by police in reliance upon a warrant that later
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thus defeat one of the main purposes of the fourth amendment: to
ensure that someone other than the police at the scene makes the
decision about the reasonableness of searches and seizures. 64
Second, the same argument that police should know that more
than one person's constitutional rights are involved can certainly be
made in situations where the defendant is in police custody. Yet,
the Court in Matlock treated the defendant's presence or absence at
the time consent to search was sought as a matter of indifference.
The facts that Matlock was in police custody and that the police ob-
viously knew that Matlock had a stake in the occurrence of the
search did not convince the Court that the search should be
invalidated.65
Third, the "police viewpoint" argument is based on the idea
that once police are alerted to the defendant's "rights" in the prop-
erty, their search becomes unreasonable. This, however, assumes
that the defendant's rights in the property are such that his or her
objection should be sufficient to deter the police from their search.
The "possession and control" test adopted by the Court in Matlock
provides no support for the idea that the defendant has any right to
prevent a police search of his or her jointly occupied premises when
one of his or her co-occupants consents. Thus, there is no reason
for the suspect's presence to make the police believe that their ac-
tions in searching the premises are unreasonable. Even if Matlock
was neutral on the issue of the suspect's "right" to prevent a search,
however, the fact is that the "police viewpoint" argument begs the
question at issue by assuming that the suspect does have such a right.
Thus, the "police viewpoint" argument does not provide solid sup-
port for treating a present, objecting defendant differently from the
"absent" defendant in Matlock. The argument merely rests on un-
substantiated assumptions.
One final argument against the proposition that courts after
proved defective could be admitted in court as long as the police were acting reasonably
in relying on the warrant. Id.
Judicial support for a general consideration of the police viewpoint in evaluating the
validity of searches, however, in no way negates the argument that the police viewpoint
idea should not be used to validate searches occurring in the absence of the person at
whom the search was directed. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
64 The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
these inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of beingjudged by. the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
cnme.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
65 See supra notes 14 & 36 and accompanying text.
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Matlock should still recognize a rule in which a present, objecting
defendant could invalidate a third-party consent search is that such
a rule would be futile. The police would either wait until their sus-
pect was not at home and an unsuspecting co-occupant was, or
would procure the "absence" of the suspect by arresting him or
her.66 If there is one co-occupant who will consent readily to a
search, the only way to keep police from circumventing the rule
against searching when one co-occupant is present and objects to
the search would be to require police to obtain the permission of all
co-occupants before conducting a search. Such a requirement
clearly would contradict the Supreme Court's holding in Matlock.67
Given the previous analysis, the Matlock decision forecloses the
possibility that the Supreme Court would accept a rule allowing a
third-party consent search to be invalidated by the presence of an
objecting co-occupant. In addition, the analysis presented above
does not change if more than one co-occupant objects to the search.
Thus, a third-party consent search would be equally valid where
only one co-occupant gives his or her consent to the search and more
than one of his or her fellow occupants objects. This result follows
from the Supreme Court's focus in Matlock on the relationship of the
consenter to the property. It also follows from the Court's failure in
Matlock to address the third-party consent issue in terms of the
whereabouts of the party at whom the search is directed. Additional
support for the idea that one co-occupant's consent will validate a
search made over the objections of multiple co-occupants comes
from the Supreme Court's use of the plural in articulating the as-
sumption of risk basis for the "possession and control" test: "[T]he
others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit
the common area to be searched." 68
In light of the broad scope of the third-party consent exception
created by the Supreme Court in Matlock, it is important that the
exception be evaluated carefully to ensure that it comports with the
constitutional standards of the fourth amendment.
V. A CONSTITUTIONAL EVALUATION OF THE THIRD-PARTY CONSENT
DOCTRINE AS DEVELOPED BY THE SUPREME COURT IN
MATLOCK
When the Supreme Court carves out an exception to a general
66 See, e.g., Note, Constitutional Law--Search and Seizure-Evidence Gained from Search to
Which Wife Consented Admissible Against Husband, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (1966).
67 See supra note 37 (discussion of Haskett).
68 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added).
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constitutional requirement and then devises a test for the applica-
tion of that exception, as the Court has done with third-party con-
sent searches, there are two levels of analysis that should be used to
evaluate the Supreme Court's actions. First, the test adopted by the
Court for applying the exception should be examined. If that test
does not comport with constitutional standards, then a new test
should be developed, although the exception may still stand. Sec-
ond, if the test for application of the exception is in accordance with
the principles of the Constitution, the rationale behind the excep-
tion itself must be examined. It is not sufficient to use a test that
passes constitutional muster to apply an exception that does not
also meet constitutional standards. Therefore, both the "possession
and control" test and the third-party consent exception itself must
be evaluated in light of fourth amendment standards.
A. THE "POSSESSION AND CONTROL" TEST AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
There are two general schools of thought with regard to the
purposes of the fourth amendment. One is that the fourth amend-
ment was "designed to ensure the security of private property." 69
The other view is that the fourth amendment guarantees a right to
privacy that goes "beyond mere property concepts." 70
These two conflicting views of the fourth amendment collided
in the 1967 case of Katz v. United States.71 In Katz, the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether evidence obtained without a
warrant, by attaching an electronic listening device to a telephone
booth, should be regarded as having been obtained in violation of
the fourth amendment. The majority in Katz adopted the broader
privacy approach to the fourth amendment, saying that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." 72 Justice Harlan, in a
concurring opinion, developed a two-part "reasonable expectation
of privacy" test for determining when the fourth amendment affords
protection to a particular privacy interest: "[T]here is a twofold re-
69 Note, supra note 66, at 1516.
70 Id. at 1519. See also Matthews, supra note 9, at 30; Comment, supra note 9, at 109 1-
92; Comment, supra 2, at 1057; Comment, supra note 3, at 798; Note, supra note 3, at
807.
71 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72 Id. at 351. The Court stated that "'[t]he premise that property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.' "Id. at 353 (quot-
ing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). But the Court refused to translate
the fourth amendment "into a general constitutional 'right to privacy'," id. at 350, saying




quirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy, and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "73 Justice Black, in
a strongly worded dissent, 74 used a linguistic and historical analysis
of the fourth amendment to support his view that the amendment
was intended to protect the security of property, not individuals'
rights to privacy. 75
73 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Later cases have
tended to ignore the subjective portion of justice Harlan's test and "have emphasized
the criterion of objective reasonableness when analyzing the expectation of privacy."
Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 215 n.23 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
751-53 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
9 (1968); United States v. Llanes, 398 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1032 (1969); Kirsch v. State, 10 Md. App. 565, 568-69, 271 A.2d 770, 772 (Ct. Spec.
App. 1970)).
74 Katz, 389 U.S. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting).
75 Id. Initially, it may seem that there is a good deal of inerit injustice Black's argu-
ment that the protections of the fourth amendment must be limited to tangible things
and cannot be expanded beyond the words of the amendment to include intangible
things like electronic eavesdropping. justice Black stated that "[t]here can be no doubt
that the Framers were aware of. . . [eavesdropping], and if they had desired to outlaw
or restrict the use of evidence obtained by eavesdropping,. . . they would have used the
appropriate language to do so in the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 366. This histori-
cal/linguistic analysis when carried to its logical extreme, however, reaches unsatisfac-
tory results. For example, the Framers surely knew that people had offices, yet the word
"offices" is not included in the fourth amendment. Does that mean that offices may be
searched by the government at will? Surely not-yet that is what justice Black's analysis
seems to suggest.
The above discussion indicates that the fourth amendment must protect more inter-
ests than its words, read literally, would imply. Even some rather early Supreme Court
cases, although generally sympathetic to a property approach to the fourth amendment,
recognize this fact. Seej. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 25 (1982). For example, in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Supreme Court stated that the English case of
Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. (Eng. C.P.) 275 (1765), could be
regarded as providing a good explanation of what is meant by the fourth amendment
because "it may confidently be asserted that its propositions were in the minds of those
who framed the Fourth Amendment." 116 U.S. at 626-27. The Court went on to say
that
[t]he principles laid down in [Entick] affect the very essence of constitutional liberty
and security. . . . [T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the government and
its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of ife. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the es-
sence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property. ...
Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
Although the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test set up by the majority in Katz
may not be the ideal way to identify that something more than mere property that is
protected by the fourth amendment, it is surely a better attempt to protect the values
that the Framers thought to be important when drafting the amendment than would be a
rule limiting application of the amendment strictly to the words used, and the abuses of
which the Framers were aware that fall within the literal meaning of those words. This
seems especially true as technology advances and new and better ways of searching with-
out breaking doors and rummaging drawers become available.
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The "possession and control" test adopted by the Court in Mat-
lock at first glance seems to be much more consistent with the
property-oriented approach rejected by the Supreme Court in Katz
than with the privacy-oriented approach that was adopted. The
"possession and control" test is "founded upon the consenting
party's relationship to the place searched." 76 The test appears to be
place-oriented, not person-oriented 77 as would seem to be required
by the Supreme Court's statement in Katz that "the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places." s78 In fact, Katz has been used to
criticize the Matlock decision.79
It is possible, however, to reconcile the "possession and con-
trol" test, at least superficially, with the "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test used in Katz.80 This may be done by noting that the
Court in Matlock defined the common authority over property that
would give a third party the right to consent to a search in terms of a
mutual use of the property that would make it reasonable to recog-
nize that the non- consenting parties "have assumed the risk that
one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched." 8' This assumption of risk language could be interpreted
to mean that the non-consenting parties no longer have any reason-
able expectation of privacy in the property, and that their rights are
therefore not violated when a search is made.8 2 This interpretation
76 Matthews, supra note 9, at 35.
77 Id. at 35-36.
78 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
79 See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 9, at 35-36; Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 281.
80 See Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 280.
81 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
82 See Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 280 (citing Dutile, Some Observations on the
Supreme Court's Use of Property Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATm.
U.L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1971)). Wefing and Miles state that:
Katz ...was specifically limited in United States v. White. In White, a person con-
sented to have his conversation with defendant taped by officials, and the Court
held that the evidence obtained was admissible. Additionally, the Court found that
the assumption of risk doctrine survived Katz and therefore a person could still lose
his expectation of privacy by confiding in another. Thus, the White reasoning could
arguably support the contention that a person who lives with another has no right
to assume that the other person will not turn over evidence or permit a search by
police.
Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 281 (discussing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971)) (footnotes omitted). Wefing and Miles argue, however, that the assumption of
risk doctrine should not be extended from the "consent to tape a conversation" situa-
tion to a "consent to search" situation because the latter is inherently more intrusive. Id.
Also, "[i]n a search situation, a person's loss of privacy is not limited to the statements
openly made to others, but extends to information which the individual has attempted to
keep confidential." Id.
Ultimately, Wefing and Miles conclude that "the assumption of risk doctrine does
not adequately protect constitutional rights, and should therefore be rejected." Id. This
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would bring the Matlock "possession and control" analysis into line
with the privacy approach to the fourth amendment that was
adopted in Katz.83
This reconciliation, however, is not entirely satisfactory if the
practical results, as opposed to the abstract concept, of the "posses-
sion and control" test are evaluated in light of the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" test. This dichotomy results from what the
Court in Matlock allowed to serve as an assumption of risk for pur-
poses of the third-party consent exception. There is nothing inher-
ently "reasonable" in the notion that one's right to prevent a
warrantless search of his or her home can be overridden by another
with no greater possessory interest in that home.8 4 The unreasona-
bleness of such a position increases when the search involves prem-
ises shared by more than two occupants. In this situation, the
Court's test would allow a single co-occupant's consent to override
conclusion is sound, at least in the third-party consent situation. For a discussion of this
point, see infra text accompanying notes 84-89.
83 This argument may be even more convincing in the case of the "exclusive use"
variant of the "possession and control" test. The "exclusive use" test essentially ex-
cludes from a third-party consent search any items that are under the sole control of the
non-consenting party. Thus, one co-occupant could consent to the search ofjointly oc-
cupied premises, but not to the search of the other co-occupant's handbag, or perhaps
even the other co-occupant's bedroom if that room is reserved specifically for the use of
the non-consenting co-occupant. This "exclusive use" test can be seen as wholly con-
sistent with the "possession and control" test because if something is reserved for the
exclusive use of one party, it is difficult to see how another party could have common
authority over that same object. See Comment, supra note 8, at 37. The "exclusive use"
concept also seems consistent with the "reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine de-
veloped in Katz, because a person normally will have a greater "expectation of privacy"
as to areas and things that are set aside for his or her exclusive use and a lesser "expecta-
tion of privacy" as to areas and things over which he or she shares common authority
with others. See Note, supra note 3, at 810. The exclusive use concept was neither
adopted nor rejected explicitly by the Supreme Court in Matlock, so its status in the
Court is uncertain. Matthews, supra note 9, at 32. But the concept has been used by a
number of courts as a part of the "possession and control" rationale. See, W. RINGEL,
supra note 40, at § 9.5(d); Note, Limitations on Third Party Consent to Search the Property of
Another, 20 S. Txx. L.J. 381, 386 (1980); Note, supra note 3, at 809; Comment, supra note
8, at 24 and the cases cited in these sources. See also United States v. Robinson, 479 F.2d
300, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1973) (Swygert, C.J., dissenting) and cases cited therein. E.g.,
United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wilson, 590 F.2d
883 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d
253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969); Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915
(4th Cir. 1965); Roberts v. United States, 332 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Poole, 307 F. Supp. 1185 (E.D. La. 1967); People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312
P.2d 665 (1957); State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii 622, 372 P.2d 365 (1972); People v. Gonza-
lez, 50 Misc. 2d 508, 270 N.Y.S.2d 727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); State v. McCarthy, 20 Ohio
App. 2d 275, 253 N.E.2d 789 (1969).
84 See, e.g., Bender, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure: A Request for Reevaluation, 4
CRIM. L. BULL. 343, 351 (1968); Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 280; Comment, supra
note 9, at 1109; Comment, supra note 3, at 807; Note, supra note 3, at 813.
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the objections of all the other co-occupants.8 5
Applying Justice Harlan's two-part test,8 6 it is difficult to see
how the Court could take the position that co-occupants have no
objectively reasonable 7 expectation of privacy in their homes. A
home may be shared by several occupants, but that does not neces-
sarily mean that the co-occupants expect intrusions by police of-
ficers bent on making warrantless searches. 8 At best, the Court in
Matlock could have been taking the position that the expectation of
privacy in jointly occupied premises is not one that society is pre-
pared to recognize as reasonable.8 9 The Court does not, however,
provide any support for this position. Absent any such support, it is
difficult to conceive of why a person's right, vis-a-vis the govern-
ment, to be free of unreasonable searches should be altered by the
fact that he or she has chosen to live with others rather than alone.
Even if the "possession and control" test were completely rec-
oncilable with the purposes of the fourth amendment as explicated
in Katz, there remains the question of whether the third-party con-
sent exception itself is consonant with fourth amendment principles.
B. THE THIRD-PARTY CONSENT EXCEPTION, THE GENERAL CONSENT
EXCEPTION, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Logically, the third-party consent search exception to the
fourth amendment should be regarded as part of the general con-
sent search exception. 90 It is also logical, therefore, that the same
85 See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
86 See supra text accompanying note 73.
87 See supra note 73 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard. A sub-
jective analysis, as originally suggested by Justice Harlan, would, of course, depend on
the facts involved in each particular case.
88 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 9, at 1121.
89 This reading of the Matlock opinion is supported by the Court's statement that "it
is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspec-
tion in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched." 415 U.S. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added).
Whether the Court was actually holding that society is not prepared to view as reason-
able an expectation of privacy in this situation depends upon whether, when the Court
said "recognize," it was acknowledging a commonly held view or merely was holding
that this view was the correct one. If the Court was acknowledging a commonly held
view, it presented no data or evidence to support its statement that the view is in fact
commonly held. If the Court was holding that this view was the correct one regardless
of general opinion, it failed to present a principled basis for such a holding.
90 See Note, supra note 3, at 808; Comment, supra note 8, at 37. To the best of this
author's knowledge, no court or commentator has ever suggested that the third-party
consent exception be separated from the general consent exception or justified as an
independent exception to fourth amendment requirements. The Supreme Court cer-
tainly made no such suggestion in Matlock. In fact, the Court seemed to tie the two
exceptions together. 415 U.S. at 171.
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rationale supporting a general consent search exception to fourth
amendment requirements also should support the third-party con-
sent exception. Unfortunately, a comparison of the rationale sup-
porting the general consent exception with the rationale supporting
the third-party consent exception is very difficult because the
Supreme Court has never explained clearly the theoretical under-
pinnings of either.91
The exemption of searches conducted pursuant to consent may
possibly be regarded as an attempt by the Supreme Court to vitiate
the harsh results of the exclusionary rule that bars the use, both in
federal and state courts, of evidence obtained through an illegal
search and seizure.92 Because searches generally are held to be un-
91 See, e.g., Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 211; Comment, supra note 8, at 12. See
also infra notes 99, 103, 104 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 214; Comment, supra note 9, at 1090-91.
But see Comment, supra note 3, at 800 (suggesting that the need for effective law enforce-
ment does not underlie the general consent exception to fourth amendment require-
ments).
The Supreme Court itself has observed that the strictness of the exclusionary rule
may lead courts to dilute constitutional protections in order to protect the efficiency of
law enforcement:
[o]ne is now faced with the dilemma. . . of choosing between vindicating sound
Fourth Amendment principles at the possible expense of state concerns, long rec-
ognized to be consonant with the Fourteenth Amendment before Mapp [v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961)]. . . came on the books, or diluting the Federal Bill of Rights
in the interest of leaving the States at least some elbow room in their methods of
criminal law enforcement.
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 769 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omit-
ted).
The exclusionary rule, see supra text accompanying note 92, bars "the use of evi-
dence secured through an illegal search and seizure." E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 360.
The rule was first developed by the Supreme Court for application in federal courts in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule was later applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
The exclusionary rule has been the object of much criticism in recent years, from
both judges and commentators. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 413-19 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("until we face up to the basic constitutional
mistakes of Mapp. . . no solid progress in setting things straight in search and seizure
law will, in my opinion, occur." Id. at 498-99). See also S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY
INJUSTICE (1977); Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964);
McGarr, The Exclusionary Rule: An Ill-Conceived and Ineffective Remedy, 52J. CRIM. L., CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 266 (1961); Miles, Decline of the Fourth Amendment. Time to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio, 27 CATm. U.L. REV. 9 (1977); Murphy, Judicial Review of Police Methods in
Law Enforcement: The Problem of Compliance by Police Departments, 44 TEx. L. REV. 939
(1966); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a Deterrent to
Police?, 62JUDICATURE 404 (1979); Wilkey, A Callfor Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 62
JUDICATURE 351 (1979); Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62
JUDICATURE 214 (1978); Wingo, Growing Disillusionment with the Exclusionary Rule, 25 Sw.
L.J. 573 (197 1); Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEX. L. REV.
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constitutional when conducted without a warrant, 93 police normally
must go through the process of obtaining a warrant, which can be
issued only upon probable cause,9 4 or run the risk that the evidence
they obtain will be suppressed in court. It would simplify the job of
police officers enormously if they could make a valid search in cases
where no objection to the search is or would be forthcoming, with-
out the necessity of obtaining a search warrant based upon probable
cause.95
Exceptions to fourth amendment requirements, however, can-
not be created whenever such an exception would simplify police
work. The specific intention of the Framers of the fourth amend-
ment was to limit the freedom of government officers to intrude
upon the "persons, houses, papers and effects" 96 of people in an
unchecked crusade to enforce the law.97 Therefore, if an exception
to the fourth amendment were created every time the operation of
the amendment limited officers in their ability to enforce the law
quickly and efficiently, there would soon be no situation still subject
to fourth amendment requirements.
Given the limited value of an argument that a general consent
exception was created to increase police efficiency, then, there must
be some other, additional reason to support such an exception.
One promising rationale for the general consent exception
might be that "[1like other important rights, the rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures can be waived." 98 Thus,
voluntary consent to a police search could be regarded as a waiver
of one's fourth amendment rights. In fact, several early Supreme
736 (1972); Note, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: Past, Present, No Future, 12 AM.
GRIM. L. REV. 507 (1975).
The debate over the exclusionary rule has centered around its efficacy as a deterrent
against police misconduct because this has become the Supreme Court's primary basis
for supporting the exclusionary rule. For a history of this development, as well as fur-
ther information regarding the exclusionary rule, seeJ. HALL, supra note 75, at 573-93;
W. RINGEL, supra note 40, at § 1.5.
93 See supra notes 2-3.
94 See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
95 SeeJ. HALL, supra note 75, at 92. See also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at
228 (1973), where the Supreme Court described the practical benefits of the consent
search exception.
96 U.S. CONST. amend IV.
97 See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 9, at 42; Comment, supra note 9, at 1091-92; Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 1057; Comment, supra note 3, at 798.
98 E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 367. See also R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES 171 (1964); E. FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 104 (1970); W. RINGEL, supra note
40, at § 9.1; Bender, supra note 84, at 343; Comment, supra note 9, at 1089, 1098; Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 1060; Comment, supra note 3, at 800; Note, supra note 3, at 808;
Comment, supra note 8, at 12.
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Court consent search decisions may be read as supporting this
waiver approach to the consent issue. 99
Basing the general consent exception to fourth amendment re-
quirements upon a waiver theory would have troublesome implica-
tions for the third-party consent exception. If a consent to a search
directed at one's self is regarded as a waiver of one's constitutional
rights, then how else can a consent to a search directed at another
be regarded except as a waiver of that other person's constitutional
99 For example, the Supreme Court seemed to rely upon a waiver approach in Amos
v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921). In Amos, the Court considered the validity of a
wife's consent to search a home that she shared with her husband, and held that implied
coercion on the part of the Internal Revenue Service collectors conducting the search
precluded a finding of waiver by consent. Id. at 317. A waiver approach to consent
searches also seemed to underlie the decision in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10
(1948). In Johnson, the Supreme Court held that whenJohnson allowed narcotics agents
to enter her apartment after they knocked on her door and said they wanted to speak
with her, her actions were to be regarded as a "submission to authority rather than as an
understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
Two later cases, Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), rev'don other grounds, 330
U.S. 800 (1947), and Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), are cited occasionally
as examples of the waiver approach being applied to consent searches. See, e.g., Com-
ment, supra note 9, at 1089 n.12; Comment, supra note 2, at 1059 n.23.
Zap involved government contracts with a waiver provision which provided that the
contractor's records were open for inspection by the government . . . . Davis in-
volved a violation of wartime gasoline rationing laws where Davis' gas station em-
ployee sold gas at Davis' direction without coupons and over ceiling price. When
the officers measured his tanks, they alleged a shortage of the required coupons.
Davis claimed he had them, but he first refused to produce them. The officers per-
sisted on the ground the coupons were government property of which Davis was
merely the custodian. Davis produced the coupons but did not have enough to
justify the amount of gasoline in his tanks, and he was charged.
J. HALL, supra note 75, at 94-95 (footnotes omitted).
Both Zap and Davis actually are departures from the standard waiver approach, how-
ever, because in each case, the Court failed to examine carefully the nature of the de-
fendant's consent. A waiver of a constitutional right usually requires a knowing and
intelligent waiver of a known right. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See also
E. CORWIN, supra note 2, at 367. Such a knowing and intelligent waiver requirement was
not imposed in either Zap or Davis. In Zap, the defendant did not consent to the seizure
of the records, yet the Court held that "there was no wrongdoing in the method by
which the incriminating evidence was obtained." 328 U.S. at 630. In Davis, the Court
"simply disregarded the Amos waiver approach while nominally distinguishing that case
on its facts." Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 219.
Commentators have offered various explanations for the holdings in Zap and Davis.
See, e.g.,J. HALL, supra note 75, at 95 n.2; 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1(a), at
613 (1978). Perhaps the best explanation is that both cases turned on an "implied con-
sent" that was created when the defendants did business with the government. As men-
tioned above, Davis engaged "in a business which involved the handling of documents
considered to be government property," and Zap "agreed to permit inspection of his
accounts and records in return for obtaining government business." Wefing & Miles,
supra note 8, at 221-22. Thus, Davis and Zap "should not be considered as typical con-
sent search cases." Id. at 224.
Another case that may support the waiver approach to consent searches is Stoner v.




The waiver by one person of another's constitutional rights, ab-
sent an express agency relationship, generally is considered unac-
ceptable. 10' Utilizing the waiver theory to support the general
consent exception to the fourth amendment, therefore, not only
does not support the third-party consent exception, but in fact seems
to make support of such a third-party consent exception extremely
difficult.10 2
The fact that in some early cases, the Supreme Court appeared
to be leaning towards adopting a waiver approach to consent
searches may thus explain why, in early cases involving searches
consented to by third parties, such searches were held invalid. 10 3
100 See Bender, supra note 84, at 350; Matthews, supra note 9, at 33; Wefing & Miles,
supra note 8, at 278; Comment, supra note 9, at 1089; Comment, supra note 3, at 801;
Note, supra note 3, at 808;.
101 See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); United States ix rel. Cabey v.
Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839, 845 (3rd Cir. 1970). See also C. BERRY, ARREST, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE 95 (1973); R. DAVIS, supra note 98, at 5, 200; E. FISHER, supra note 98, at 119; N.
SOBEL, supra note 40, at 130; Bender, supra note 84, at 350; Matthews, supra note 9, at 33;
Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 278; Comment, supra note 9, at 1089; ; Comment, supra
note 3, at 801; Note, supra note 3, at 808.
102 It could be argued that third-party consent is consistent with a waiver theory be-
cause the third party is waiving only his or her own rights in the property over which he
or she has common authority. This analysis, however, cannot avoid the problem that the
third party is also committing a defacto waiver of another's rights. See Bender, supra note
84, at 350; Matthews, supra note 9, at 33; Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 278; Comment,
supra note 9, at 1089; Comment, supra note 3, at 801; Note, supra note 3, at 808. The
view that the third party is waiving only his or her own rights appears particularly
strained in the situation where another party with an equal interest in the property is
present and objects to the search.
103 For example, in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), the Court recog-
nized the invalidity of house searches based upon the consent of boarders or neighbors.
Id. at 386, 398. In Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), which has been
described as "[t]he first real third party consent search case decided by the Court," J.
HALL, supra note 75, at 96, a search was invalidated on the grounds that the consent of a
landlord is not sufficient to allow a search of his tenant's premises. 365 U.S. at 616-18.
The government had attempted to uphold the search on the grounds of a landlord's
property right to enter and view waste. Id. at 616. The Court declined, however, to
impose technical property law distinctions of "largely historical" validity upon "the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
. .. Id. at 617. The Court also noted that the search involved in the case required
the landlord to force open a window, which was not a part of his right to view waste.
The landlord's purpose in entering was not really to view waste at all, said the Court, but
rather to search for evidence of a crime. Id. at 616. Ultimately, the Court concluded
that "to uphold such an entry, search and seizure 'without a warrant would reduce the
(Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants'] homes secure only in the discre-
tion of [landlords].' " Id. at 616-17 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948)) (inserts by the Court).
Three years after Chapman, in the case of Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964),
the Supreme Court again invalidated a search based on the consent of a third party. In
Stoner, the government tried to validate a search of the defendant's hotel room on the
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More recent cases, however, implicitly recognized the validity of
third-party consent searches without expressly rejecting the waiver
approach to the general consent exception. 0 4 The viability of the
basis of the consent of a hotel clerk who gave the police access to the defendant's room.
Id. at 487-88. The Court rejected this theory with the statement that "[o]ur decisions
make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded by
strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent author-
ity'." Id. at 488. The Court also seemed to regard the consent to search as a waiver:
"[i]t is important to bear in mind that it was the petitioner's constitutional right which
was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor the hotel's. It was a right, therefore,
which only the petitioner could waive by word or deed, either directly or through an
agent." Id. at 489.
In all of these cases, the person who consented to the search was neither the party at
whom the search was directed nor the party with full control over the property being
searched.
104 In Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), the Court considered the valid-
ity of a search that was based on the consent of the suspect's grandmother. The grand-
mother's consent was obtained after police informed her that they had a warrant to
search her house. The Court held that the search was invalid because the grandmother's
consent was not truly voluntary. It stated that "[w]hen a law enforcement officer claims
authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has
no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion-albeit colorably
lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent." Id. at 550. The
Court impliedly recognized, however, that had the consent of the grandmother been
voluntary, the search would have been valid, despite the fact that the search was not
directed at her, because she "owned both the house [the place that was searched] and
the rifle [the object that was seized]." Id. at 548 n.11. The Court stated that "the peti-
tioner concede[d] that her [the grandmother's] voluntary consent to the search would
have been binding upon him," id., and made no argument against that position.
Wefing and Miles note that the holding in Bumper is consistent with the waiver ap-
proach to fourth amendment rights, and that Bumper is the only one of the three cases
involving acquiescence to a "demand under color of lawful authority" (Amos and Johnson
being the other two cases, see supra note 99) that "failed to rest its holding explicitly on
the waiver rationale." Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 225. Perhaps the Court's failure
to utilize the waiver rationale in Bumper was due in part to a perceived inconsistency
between that rationale and a recognition of the constitutional validity of third-party con-
sent searches.
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), involved a slightly different situation than did
Bumper. In Bumper, the party giving consent had legal title to the property being
searched, but was not the person at whom the search was directed. In Frazier, the party
who consented to the search was the one at whom the search was directed, but the object
searched (a duffel bag) belonged to his cousin (petitioner in the case). Id. at 740. The
duffel bag was being used jointly by the petitioner and his cousin Rawls, and had been
left by petitioner in Rawls' home. While the police were in the process of arresting
Rawls, they asked for his clothing. They were told that it was in the duffel bag, and both
Rawls and his mother consented to a search of the bag. Id. The Court "dismissed rather
quickly" the petitioner's argument that clothing of his that had been found in the duffel
bag should have been excluded from evidence at his trial:
Since Rawls was a joint user of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its
search. The officers therefore found evidence against petitioner while in the course
of an otherwise lawful search. Under this Court's past decisions, they were clearly
permitted to seize it. . . . Petitioner argues that Rawls only had actual permission
to use one compartment of the bag and that he had no authority to consent to a
search of the other compartments. We will not, however, engage in such metaphys-
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waiver approach was thus cast into doubt.
Finally, in 1973, the Supreme Court in the general consent case
of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte 105 once again had the opportunity to ad-
dress the question of whether consent to search is a waiver of consti-
tutional rights. As mentioned above, a finding that the general
consent search exception is based upon a waiver theory would mean
that third-party consents could not be encompassed easily in that
general consent exception. A finding that the general consent ex-
ception is not based upon a waiver theory would leave that excep-
tion without an articulated rationale.
The Supreme Court, perhaps recognizing its dilemma, deliv-
ered a "strained, self-contradictory opinion"'10 6 in Schneckloth. The
opinion never fully addressed the question of the theoretical basis
for the general consent exception. The Court merely stated that a
search conducted pursuant to consent is a "well settled" exception
to fourth amendment requirements,1 0 7 mentioned the practical ben-
efits of a consent exception,' 0 8 and then proceeded to decide
whether the consent in the case was sufficiently voluntary to fall
under the consent search exception.
ical subtleties in judging the efficacy of Rawls' consent. Petitioner, in allowing Rawls
to use the bag and in leaving it in his house, must be taken to have assumed the risk
that Rawls would allow someone else to look inside. We find no valid search and
seizure claim in this case.
Id. (citations omitted).
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), has also been cited as a case
upholding the validity of a third-party consent search. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171;
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245. See alsoJ. HALL, supra note 75, at 97. In Coolidge, however, a
wife at the request of police turned over items belonging to her husband. 403 U.S. at
446. The Court did not treat this as a search. Id. at 489-90. Therefore, there is some
question as to the precedential effect of this case on third-party consent issues. See Wef-
ing & Miles, supra note 8, at 259; Comment, supra note 9, at 1093.
Note that Bumper and Frazier are the only cases decided prior to 1973 in which the
search by police was treated by the Supreme Court as a "search" for purposes of review
and third-party consent was impliedly held to validate the search. In both cases, the
consent was given by one who either owned and controlled the property being searched
or by the one at whom the search was directed. These cases were thus distinguishable
from prior cases in which third-party consents were invalidated. Therefore, these two
cases did not necessarily represent a rejection of previous Supreme Court holdings on
(or the waiver approach to) the question of third-party consent searches. Nor do these
two cases contain any discussion of an alternative theoretical basis for the consent search
exception to the fourth amendment.
105 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
106 Wefing & Miles, supra note 8, at 212.
107 412 U.S. at 219. The Court cites Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946), and
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946), as support for this "well settled" exception.
Yet, as was pointed out supra note 99, these two cases really seem to have been decided
on the basis of an "implied consent" to a search conducted by government officials on
the part of an individual doing business with the government.
108 412 U.S. at 227.
1984]
COMMENTS
It was at this point that the Schneckloth decision became compli-
cated. One of the arguments against a holding that the consent in
question was valid was that consent was a "waiver" of fourth amend-
ment rights10 9 that, underJohnson v. Zerbst, 10 must be shown by the
State to be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege.""' The Court rejected this argument in
Schneckloth. To support its decision, the Court tried to explain why
its references, in prior cases, to consent searches as "waivers" did
not really mean "waivers" in the Zerbst sense."12 The Court also
noted that the requirement of "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege"' 13 previously had been
applied mostly to those rights that guarantee a fair criminal trial,
and then stated that the requirement thus should not be expanded
to cover consent searches, which are "of a wholly different or-
der."1 14 The Court ultimately held that the Zerbst standard need not
be met in consent searches, and that consent will serve to validate a
search if the consent is determined to be voluntary in view of all the
circumstances of the case."15
The reason that this decision complicates any analysis of the
theoretical bases of the general consent search exception is that
although the Court clearly rejects the waiver approach for evaluat-
ing the validity of particular consent searches, it does not evaluate
the ramifications of that holding for a waiver approach as the basis
for the general consent search exception. Some of the Court's lan-
guage suggests that consent still may be regarded as some sort of
waiver, despite the Court's holding that consent to search is not the
type of waiver that must be knowing and intelligent to be effective:
"[o]ur cases do not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and
intelligent waiver in every situation where a person has failed to in-
voke a constitutional protection."' 16 Other language, however, sug-
gests that a waiver theory cannot serve as the basis of the general
consent search exception: "a 'waiver' approach to consent searches
would be thoroughly inconsistent with our decisions that have ap-
proved 'third-party consents'." 1 7
Thus, Schneckloth at the very least casts serious doubt upon the
109 Id. at 235.
110 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
111 Id. at 464.
112 412 U.S. at 243 n.31.
113 304 U.S. at 464.
114 412 U.S. at 242.
115 Id. at 248-49.
116 Id. at 235.
117 Id. at 245. This approval was by implication only. See supra note 104.
[Vol. 75992
THIRD-PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES
continued validity of a waiver theory as the basis for the general
consent exception to fourth amendment requirements. Perhaps the
Court's statement in Matlock that "[m]ore generally, in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, we noted that our prior recognition of the constitutional
validity of 'third-party consent' searches . . . supported the view
that a consent search is fundamentally different in nature from the
waiver of a trial right,"'" s taken together with Matlock's explicit rec-
ognition of the validity of third-party consent searches, constitute
the best evidence that the Supreme Court has indeed abandoned
the waiver theory as a basis for the general consent search exception
to fourth amendment requirements." 19
To review then, the general consent exception and the third-
party consent exception are logically related, and thus should share
a common rationale. Both exceptions can be supported by argu-
ments based on the convenience and efficiency of law enforcement
officers. Efficiency, however, should not be a sufficient excuse for
abandoning fourth amendment protections.
The main theory that has been used to support the general con-
sent search exception-the waiver theory-does not support, and
may be directly contrary to, recognition of a third-party consent ex-
ception. If the waiver theory is the basis for the general consent
exception, then the third-party consent exception cannot be re-
garded as part of that general exception because the two concepts
cannot be supported by the same rationale. But if the third-party
consent exception is to be regarded as a separate, independent ex-
ception to fourth amendment requirements, the Supreme Court cer-
tainly failed to mention that fact in Matlock.120 The Court also failed
to provide a theoretical basis for such an independent exception so
that the exception could be evaluated in light of the purposes of the
fourth amendment and so that its parameters could be determined.
If, however, the Supreme Court rejected the waiver theory as a
basis for the general consent search exception in Schneckloth, as
seems probable, then the Court has left us with no theory at all to
support either the general consent exception or the third-party con-
sent exception.
118 415 U.S. at 171 (citations omitted).
119 Many commentators feel that even if the Supreme Court has abandoned the
waiver theory as a rationale for the general consent exception, it should not ignore the
fact that third-party consent searches operate as a defacto waiver of another's rights. See
Bender, supra note 84, at 350; Matthews, supra note 9, at 33; Wefing & Miles, supra note
8, at 278; Comment, supra note 9, at 1089; Comment, supra note 3, at 801; Note, supra
note 3, at 808.
120 In fact, the Court tied the third-party consent exception to the general consent




The Supreme Court's decision in Matlock v. United States12' for
the first time explicitly recognized the validity of searches based
upon the consent of someone other than the person at whom the
search was directed. The test adopted by the Court for analyzing
third-party consent searches would allow valid searches to be made
pursuant to the consent of one co-occupant of a premises who is
present at the time of the search and over the objection of one or
more co-occupants who are also present at the time of the search.
Because the scope of the third-party consent exception is so broad
when the test adopted by the Court is used to apply the exception, it
is questionable whether the test used by the Court comports with
the purposes and requirements of the fourth amendment.
Even if the test utilized by the Court does comport with the
purposes of the fourth amendment, however, the scope of the ex-
ception is so broad that the exception itself should have a strong
basis in constitutional principles. Yet the Court has not provided a
theory that would logically embrace both the general consent excep-
tion and the third-party consent exception, which clearly seem to be
related. Nor has the Court explained why the third-party consent
exception can stand independently as a proper exception to fourth
amendment requirements. Until the Supreme Court provides such
explanations, both the purposes of the third-party consent excep-
tion and its parameters will necessarily remain in doubt, to the detri-
ment of fair and effective administration of the fourth amendment.
SHARON E. ABRAMS
121 415 U.S. 169 (1974).
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